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Abstract 
After their theoretical development in the early 1990s, Financial Transmission 
Rights (FTRs) have been applied in restructured US electricity markets for about a 
decade now. Lately, FTRs have also been proposed as a potential feature of the 
emerging European electricity market. This paper reviews the crucial differences 
between FTRs and the currently implemented physical transmission rights (PTRs), 
and investigates the institutional and regulatory prerequisites for introducing FTRs 
in Europe. Also, the paper analyzes whether FTRs could be used as a means to 
replace existing transmission contracts (ETCs) in Europe. 
The paper concludes that the introduction of FTRs would imply a conceptual shift 
from the current self-scheduling and bilateral approach to cross-border trading in 
Europe, to a more central scheduling approach. The smoothest transition from 
PTRs to FTRs would be achieved by auctioning PTRs with a use-it-or-sell-it 
property and gradually phasing out their physical usage. As a prerequisite, the 
introduction of cross-border FTRs requires the integration of national markets 
through power exchanges. The resulting quasi-monopoly position of the power 
exchanges with respect to cross-border trading would require a tighter relationship 
between power exchanges and transmission system operators (TSOs) and a new 
regulatory approach to power exchanges, e.g., regulated fees. An introduction of 
regionally applied FTRs would also require a closer cooperation between national 
TSOs, especially with regard to the determination of a simultaneously feasible set of 
FTRs and a more detailed grid model reflecting the actual congestion situation.  
The paper argues that FTRs have not been subject to financial regulation in the 
past, as both their volume and their value are determined purely by the physical 
dispatch and network situation. Hence, any manipulation of FTRs would occur by 
manipulating the physical market, which is covered by energy regulation.  
Regarding ETCs, it is shown that FTRs can only cover their congestion cost aspect, 
while other ETC provisions related to transmission and energy supply can’t be 
accounted for by FTRs. As there are no historical entitlements to offsetting cross-
border congestion cost in Europe (in the absence of ETCs), FTRs would not be 
allocated to load scheduling entities for free, but would be auctioned off with the 
auction proceeds being allocated to transmission owners or transmission investors, 
e.g. via Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs).  
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Finally, further research is needed to determine the extent to which financial 
instruments such as futures are able to replace or complement FTRs for hedging 
cross-border congestion risk. 
 
Keywords: European Electricity System, Congestion Management, Physical 
Transmission Rights, Financial Transmission Rights, Institutional Framework. 
 
Nomenclature 
Throughout this paper, the abbreviation FTR stands for Financial Transmission Right, 
which refers to the financial instrument originally described by Hogan (1992). The same 
financial instrument is called Transmission Congestion Contract (TCC) by the New York 
ISO, and it is called Congestion Revenue Rights (CRR) by the California ISO, the 
Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), and at the US Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC). Importantly, in this paper FTR does not refer to Firm 
Transmission Rights, which are physical rights and have been used e.g. at the California 
ISO. 
The term FTR seems to be somewhat overused and has different meanings for different 
people. To prevent misunderstandings, the authors propose to rename this instrument in 
the European context. One option would be to take over FERC’s wording and call it 
(cross-border) Congestion Revenue Right (CRR). Another option would be a term that 
emphasizes its cross-border congestion risk hedging property. Nevertheless, for reasons 
of simplicity, this paper will continue using the term FTR.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1.  Evolution of cross-border capacity allocation schemes in Europe 
Starting in the early 1970s, an increasing exchange of electricity between European states 
has been observed, amounting to some 350 TWh or approximately 14% of the overall 
UCTE electricity consumption in 2007, i.e. 2565 TWh (see figure 1). There are two 
driving factors behind this development, a technical one and a techno-economic one: 
First, there is an uneven spatial distribution of load centers and generation plants across 
Europe, which requires energy transport over long distances. Second, there is a diverse 
generation technology mix from country to country, which is due to different 
environmental2 and political3 conditions. On one hand, varying generation technologies 
lead to several (national) price levels across Europe, which in turn induce an economic 
incentive to transport electric power between national markets. On the other hand, they 
enable regionally different electricity storage capabilities (e.g. through pump-storage 
hydropower) that again cause (time and price dependent) energy flows between European 
states. 
                                                 
2
 E.g. the availability of wind and water resources. 
3
 E.g. support or not for nuclear energy. 
 3 
 
 
Figure 1: Development of cross-border electricity exchanges (load-flows) within the UCTE area 
(blue) and between the UCTE and neighboring areas (purple). Source: UCTE (2008) 
 
As interconnections between national transmission systems as well as transit lines within 
states were mostly built for security and back-up purposes only, this steadily increasing, 
commercial cross-border activity encounters more and more physical transmission 
constraints leading to congestion, i.e. commercial demand exceeding actual network 
capacity. Obviously, such situations require a mechanism to allocate scarce transmission 
capacity to market participants. Generally, it can be distinguished between three 
conceptual models for capacity allocation: (1) the contract path model, (2) the flow-based 
model, and (3) the point-to-point model with implicit flows (Hogan, 2006). As will be 
described next, cross-border transmission capacity allocation in Europe continues to rely 
on a contract-path model and a physical transmission rights (PTR) framework. 
 
In 2003, the European Commission defined the legal framework on conditions for access 
to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, emphasizing the need for 
market-based schemes (as opposed to administrative schemes). According to EC 
regulation 1228/2003 and subsequent decision 2006/770, explicit or implicit auction 
mechanisms are an appropriate market-based measure to allocate available cross-border 
capacities to market participants (EC, 2003; EC, 2006).  
Explicit auctions commonly describe the concept that a Transmission System Operator 
(TSO) auctions off available cross-border transmission capacity to market participants. 
This is done through PTRs, which allow its holder to schedule cross-border electricity 
exchanges between adjacent countries to the extent it obtained PTRs. A PTR therefore is 
a carve-out of transmission capacity on a certain contract-path, such as on a country 
border. PTRs are usually sliced to several time horizons, e.g. yearly, monthly and daily 
rights, and they are mostly designed as tradable rights, i.e. once bought, they can be 
transferred (sold) to other market participants. 
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Based on the impression that the sequential operation of capacity and energy markets 
may lead to sub-optimal results as market parties would need to anticipate future energy 
market outcomes (e.g. one year ahead) when buying PTRs, the concept of “implicit 
auctions” was brought forward. The underlying idea of implicit auctions is that capacity 
and energy are auctioned simultaneously. Market parties would buy and sell energy on a 
market platform, and the market operator together with TSOs would implicitly ensure 
that grid capacity is sufficient to guarantee the feasibility of the trades. These cross-
border implicit auctions are usually referred to as either market coupling (if two or more 
power exchanges of national electricity markets couple their price zones), or market-
splitting (if one power exchange splits an area into several price zones in case of 
congestion between them).  
A look at the currently running implicit auctions confirms that all of them have been 
established in radial parts of the European electricity grid, i.e. over cables such as 
between Germany and Denmark (EMCC, 2008) or between radially aligned countries 
such as Spain and Portugal (MIBEL, 2008) or France, Belgium and the Netherlands 
(TLC, 2008). This is not surprising, since these examples continue relying on a physical 
contract-path model. Essentially, they are based on a certain amount of PTRs allocated by 
TSOs to the power exchanges at the day-ahead stage. The power exchanges then 
implicitly match those PTRs to cross-border trading agents based on their bids and offers. 
Clearly, a physical contract-path model works fine as long as the grid is radial or close to 
radial. In a meshed grid – and the European UCTE grid definitely is one - it can still work 
acceptably as long as regional electricity exchanges remain limited and predictable, so 
regional interdependencies and externalities (such as loop-flows) can largely be ignored. 
If these conditions are no longer met, though, the contract-path model becomes 
increasingly unwieldy. At this point, the typical reaction is to try to track and trace 
somehow the flows associated with electricity exchanges and include them in the 
transmission rights. This leads straight to the flow-based approach.  
At the time of this writing, there are two ongoing projects in Europe that aim at 
introducing a flow-based capacity allocation based on a zonal grid model, namely the 
flow-based explicit capacity auctions of the Central-East Europe regional initiative4 and 
the flow-based market coupling of the Central-West Europe regional initiative5, both 
planned to start in 2010 (ERGEG, 2008). It will be interesting to monitor their progress.  
In fact, several of the restructured US electricity markets have already experimented with 
varying styles of the flow-based model in the decade between 1997 and 2007. Among 
them are PJM, CAISO in California and ERCOT in Texas. Their experiences have not 
been satisfying, though (CAISO, 2006; ERCOT, 2008; Hogan, 1999). This is because the 
flow-based approach essentially tries to maintain the physical contract-path fiction by 
accounting for all its implications (such as loop-flows) within a meshed grid, which 
requires several simplifying assumptions6. As they turn out to be unsustainable, this 
model becomes unwieldy, too (Baldick, 2003; Ruff, 2001). 
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The three markets mentioned above therefore decided to abandon the flow-based zonal 
model and replaced it by a point-to-point model. According to this model, the System 
Operator (ISO or RTO in the US) no longer allocates path-dependent, physical 
transmission rights, but instead runs a day-ahead market with central scheduling of 
generation units as well as self-scheduling7 (including bilateral trades). The ISO 
computes locational marginal prices (LMPs) for each network node, which exposes 
market participants to congestion (and marginal loss) costs. To offset or hedge these 
congestion costs, the market participants can acquire Financial Transmission Rights 
(FTRs) issued by the ISO. They entitle its holder to receive the price difference between 
the two grid nodes specified by the FTR. FTRs are funded by the congestion rent (i.e. the 
price differences between grid nodes) collected by the ISO. To ensure revenue adequacy, 
the ISO runs a simultaneous feasibility test to determine the maximum number of FTRs 
that it can issue. For further details and a comprehensive overview of FTRs and their 
applications, see e.g. (Kristiansen 2004; ETSO, 2006). 
 
1.2. Two distinct notions of a physical right 
An FTR is a pure financial instrument. It is not a physical right, i.e. does not entitle its 
holder to any physical grid access. However, two distinct understandings of what a 
“physical right” actually is seem to exist (FERC, 2007). On one hand, the traditional 
understanding describes the right to physical capacity on a particular transmission path, 
i.e. a carve-out of transmission capacity, which is a tradable right. The term PTR usually 
refers to this understanding. On the other hand, the term “physical right” as it is used e.g. 
by FERC in the context of restructured US electricity markets, refers to “the ability to 
physically inject energy at a source and withdraw energy at a sink, through either 
submission of a self-schedule or a price bid that indicates a willingness to accept the spot 
market clearing-price. (p. 89) ” In the view of FERC, the combination of physically 
scheduling, plus holding a financial transmission right, is at least equivalent to a pure 
physical rights approach as regards certainty with respect to delivery and price. 
Advantages are to be expected because an FTR holder receives congestion revenue even 
if he does not transmit electricity8. In addition, parties do not need to reserve capacity in 
order to receive transmission service. Finally, under a PTR approach, if there is an outage 
on the line on which a customer has a capacity reservation, the electricity cannot be 
transmitted. Under a financial rights approach, however, if feasible, another generator can 
be dispatched, and the FTR holder will still receive the congestion revenue from its FTR 
(FERC, 2007).   
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1.3. FTRs and self-scheduling / bilateral trades 
The fact that FTRs do not include the physical scheduling right raises some issues, 
though, as the inclusion of physical bilateral trades remains cumbersome in many of the 
centrally dispatched ISO markets. Certainly, bilateral trades must be known to the ISO 
and taken into account for operating the market. Exactly as for pool-based bids, they have 
to bear the congestion costs defined by the locational price difference between their 
source and sink node. In case of congestion, however, they cannot be reduced based on 
their energy bid or offer prices (as these are not known to the ISO). Instead, parties 
engaged in a bilateral contract would have to indicate a bid for the maximum acceptable 
price difference to be able to compete with pool-based bids. Otherwise, uneconomic 
adjustments based on their contribution to congestion have to be applied (Berizzi, 2004; 
CAISO, 2008). Moreover, non pool-based trading does not deliver LMPs, which may 
distort their computation (Harvey et al, 2005). In a market like PJM, about 30% of total 
generation is scheduled centrally at the day-ahead stage, while the rest engages in self-
supply or bilateral trading (PJM, 2007a). This seems to be enough to operate the market 
efficiently and compute robust LMPs. In Europe, cross-border trading faces probably one 
of the most chronic and severe congestion situations worldwide9 (for reasons cited 
above). In the absence of auctioned PTRs, a 30% exchange share (i.e. 70% self-
scheduling such as bilateral trading) would never be enough to guarantee an efficient and 
secure cross-border scheduling. At the very least, it would cause tremendous redispatch 
costs. It is therefore likely that the Nordic approach would have to be adopted: In the 
Nordic region, electricity exchanges within a price zone can be done both on Nordpool 
and bilaterally, whereas exchanges between price zones (i.e. over congested 
interconnectors) can only be done on Nordpool, which ensures a feasible and economic 
scheduling. If buyers and sellers in different price zones nevertheless want to fix their 
prices in advance, they don’t engage in physical, but in financial bilateral trading. In that 
case, one could, in principle, have 100% contract cover and 100% participation in the 
pool. 
 
 
2. Allocation of FTRs 
Before FTRs can be allocated, potential FTR holders must first be defined. This is not a 
trivial task, and it depends to a high degree on the specific, historically grown structure of 
the market under consideration. In general, FTRs could be given to any combination of 
generators, load scheduling entities, transmission owners, transmission investors, holders 
of existing transmission contracts (ETCs), traders or even people outside the physical 
energy market, e.g. purely financial players. 
 
By comparing several of the restructured electricity markets, it appears that two guiding 
principles with regard to FTR allocation have been applied by most of them: (1) FTRs are 
allocated so that their benefits offset the redistribution of economic rents arising from 
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tariff reforms, and (2) FTRs are given to those who have invested in the grid or who will 
invest in transmission expansion. 
 
With regard to the fist guiding principle, a look at the restructured markets in the US 
shows that the introduction of a locational marginal pricing scheme in a formerly 
integrated market confronted load scheduling entities and independent generators with 
congestion cost they had not previously faced. Thus, it appears obvious that the 
congestion rent now collected by the ISO must at least partly be used to offset these 
congestion cost. This is usually done through an allocation of FTRs to market participants 
based on their historically served load. Similarly, in case ETCs are converted to the tariff, 
FTRs will have to be used to compensate congestion charges to former ETC parties (see 
section on ETCs). A look at the Italian model (see section 3) is also revealing: Here, 
consumers pay a single national price (SNP), which is deemed to be fair. Producers face a 
zonal price, though, which exposes them to a congestion risk compared to the SNP.  So 
Italy decided that producers would be eligible to receive FTRs.  
If one compares the starting conditions between the US markets and the continental 
European “market”, an important difference can be noticed: On one side, in the US, 
locational marginal pricing has been introduced within regions that formerly applied 
uniform pricing, or had no open access transmission tariff at all. This meant that market 
participants had to be reimbursed for newly emerging congestion cost within their 
network. On the other side, an introduction of FTRs in Europe would concern 
transmission links between formerly integrated, national markets with their own historic 
price levels. In this case, a claim to eliminate congestion cost of a specific country by 
allocating FTRs for free based on the load or imports of this country cannot be justified. 
A load-based allocation of cross-border FTRs to loads of specific countries would distort 
locational signals for the siting of new production units10. The only exception may be 
seen in cross-border ETCs, as they have exactly the purpose of linking production and 
demand between two national markets. Thus, in Europe, FTRs would rather be allocated 
to transmission owners, transmission investors, or ETC parties.  
 
This is also in line with the second guiding principle, namely that congestion rents are 
often at least partly used to finance existing or new transmission infrastructure. Perez-
Arriaga showed that in theory, congestion rents could be sufficient to fully finance the 
total grid costs. In practice however, they normally can’t contribute more than 30% 
(Pérez-Arriaga, 1995). Regarding transmission investment, the whole concept of 
merchant transmission investment relies on the idea that merchant investors receive FTRs 
to the extent that they add new capacity to the network. The benefits of allocated FTRs 
then would refund the initial investment over time. Experiences in most US markets 
indicate however that a pure merchant transmission approach is not enough to upgrade 
the grid sufficiently, especially if the grid upgrade relieves congestion and lowers the 
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benefits of FTRs (Caiso, 2004a). In this case, the merchant approach fails and a 
regulatory approach has to be applied, including investment costs into regulated tariffs.  
 
 
After eligible FTR parties have been defined, it must still be decided on how to assign 
FTRs to those parties. In general, FTRs can be assigned in either a one-step or a two-step 
process:  
(1) FTRs are directly allocated to eligible parties. 
(2) FTRs are auctioned off to eligible parties, and the auction proceeds are 
distributed. 
 
On one hand, if FTRs are allocated to eligible parties for free, they essentially offset any 
congestion charges that would otherwise arise to these parties. On the other hand, if FTRs 
are auctioned off, the congestion charges are somehow seen as justified and FTRs merely 
fix these charges in advance to the price paid for the FTRs. In this case, FTRs are 
basically a hedge against the volatility of congestion charges, but they do not offset these 
charges altogether. 
Clearly, if FTRs are auctioned off, then it must further be decided on how to allocate the 
auction proceeds. Typically, such auction proceeds are allocated to transmission owners, 
as they initially provided and financed the transmission facilities that allow the auctioning 
of FTRs. Transmission owners would use the auction proceeds for example to lower their 
access charges. In the case of Texas, FTR auction proceeds are distributed to load 
scheduling entities based on their load, simply because the transmission network was 
initially paid by all Texas rate-payers.  
PJM had implemented a one-step allocation of FTRs until 2003. From 2003 onwards, it 
auctioned 100% of FTRs and distributed the auction revenues to holders of Auction 
Revenue Rights (ARRs) that were previously allocated to load via transmission owners. 
In a sense, ARRs represent the market value of FTRs. Holders of ARRs can decide 
whether they want to receive revenues from the FTR auction, or whether they want to 
“self-schedule” their ARRs into FTRs and receive part of the congestion revenue. 
According to PJM, the main advantage of a two step scheme is a more efficient and 
flexible FTR market, as FTRs are auctioned to those parties who value them most, and 
they can easily be adjusted according to changes in supplied load. The allocation of 
ARRs could also make sense in those cases where pre-existing rights to use transmission 
(e.g. physical scheduling rights) are in place and it is intended to preserve this 
endowment11. More generally, if the two groups of (1) load bearing investment cost (or 
owning pre-existing transmission rights) and (2) load bearing congestion cost differ 
substantially, then it may be advantageous to introduce ARRs and allocate them to 
transmission owners, or owners of existing transmission contracts, while FTRs are 
auctioned to market parties bearing congestion cost. This would be the case for Europe, 
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where the share of investment cost and congestion cost differs substantially from country 
to country. 
 
2.1. The Italian model 
There has been one example of FTRs being introduced in Europe, namely the Italian 
market model launched in 2004. This model draws on some elements of the US Standard 
Market Design proposed by FERC in 2002. While consumers pay the same spot market 
price for electricity throughout Italy, called the Single National Price (SNP), producers 
are grouped into geographical zones and pay a zonal price. The zonal prices differ from 
the SNP in case of transmission constraints between zones. By acquiring an FTR (called 
CCC in Italy, Contract Covering the Risk of Volatility of the Fee for Assignment of 
Rights of Use of Transmission Capacity) through an auction, producers can however 
hedge the difference between the zonal price and the SNP. A similar FTR product was 
available for hedging price differences relating to imports from neighbouring countries, 
which were modelled as virtual price zones in the Italian market design. These FTRs, 
called DCT in Italy (Contract Covering the Fee for Assignment of Rights of Use of 
Transmission Capacity on Foreign Interconnections), were abandoned with the 
introduction of explicit PTR auctions in 2008.  
Institutionally, the Italian market is operated by GME (Gestore Mercato Elettrico), while 
the Italian grid is operated by Terna. Among other things, GME is responsible for 
running the market platform and determining the zonal prices as well as the SNP. FTRs 
are auctioned by Terna, based on the actual transmission availability. 
 
 
2.2. The Nordic model 
The Nordic region covers the countries of Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark. Their 
common market operator, Nordpool, which is owned and operated by Nordic TSOs, 
applies implicit auctions based on a zonal market splitting to manage congestion between 
and within the Nordic countries. Price differences between price zones are collected by 
Nordpool as congestion rent. 
In contrast to the FTR model, the Nordic TSOs don’t reallocate congestion rents to load 
scheduling entities as a hedge against their congestion cost12. Instead, Nordpool 
introduced so called Contracts for Differences (CFDs) in 2000, which have no connection 
to the TSO or to the congestion rents, but are concluded among market participants to 
exchange or swap their locational risk-profiles (Kristiansen, 2004). Cross-border 
congestion revenues are earmarked for the use in regional and inter-regional grid 
expansion projects (NordReg, 2007). 
 
 
2.3. Congestion rents and the hedging of congestion risk  
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A product for hedging the congestion risk can or cannot rely on the revenue stream from 
congestion rents. FTRs are covered by congestion rents, but financial instruments such as 
contracts among market participants (e.g. Nordic CFDs) or financial derivatives (e.g. 
futures offered by power exchanges) could potentially serve the same purpose, 
superseding a rather complicated FTR allocation and settlement scheme. Many observers 
view such a market solution rather negative, though. The New Zealand Electricity 
Commission notes in a 2008 report: “The primary reason for the lack of a market solution 
[for transmission hedges] is that parties supplying transmission risk management 
contracts would be vulnerable to the actions of one or two parties that could push spot 
market prices around. One way of mitigating concerns about locational price risk is to use 
loss and constraint rentals either to directly mitigate this risk for spot market purchasers 
or to underpin financial instruments, such as financial transmission rights (FTRs). The 
problem here is that policy decisions are required to determine who should have access to 
the rentals as they are not owned by anyone. [] But without guaranteed access to those 
rentals, no party would be prepared to bear the risk of supplying FTRs to the market” 
(New Zealand Electricity Commission, 2008). Despite much criticism, the feasibility of 
financial instruments should be investigated in depth, including alleged drawbacks such 
as an insufficient liquidity. 
 
 
3. FTRs and Existing Transmission Contracts (ETCs) 
FTRs are also discussed as a means to replace Existing Transmission Contracts (ETCs), 
both in Europe and in the US. The following section will shortly describe the general 
legal context with respect to ETCs on the two continents. It will then present two US case 
studies that describe how ETCs can be converted to FTRs and how they are treated if 
they are not converted to FTRs. 
 
3.1. Preliminary note on the legal situation in the US and the EU 
The outcome of liberalization policies is heavily dependent upon national or continental 
legal cultures. With respect to ETCs in the energy markets, the difference in the legal 
culture between the US and the EU is remarkable.  
In Europe the Commission, the Court of Justice and the German Bundeskartellamt took 
decisions against contracts on wholesale gas supply and electricity transmission capacity 
reservation concluded by former monopolists13. These decisions argue in favor of 
fostering competition and increase the legal pressure on the justification of ETCs in 
Europe (Bellantuono, 2008). 
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On the American side, the legal debate and a recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court 
take the opposite position, in the sense that ETCs are largely protected from any 
unilateral modification by an ISO or by a regulatory body14 (US Supreme Court, 2008). 
 
 
3.2. Case 1: California 
In 2000, FERC found that the existing congestion management method of the California 
ISO (CAISO) was fundamentally flawed. On May 1, 2002, the CAISO filed its 
Comprehensive Market Design Propsal, which later became the Market Redesign and 
Technology Upgrade Program (MRTU). The MRTU is based on the introduction of three 
core market design elements, namely: (1) a full network model (FNM), (2) locational 
marginal pricing (LMP), and (3) an integrated forward market (IFM) (CAISO, 2006).  
One of the crucial issues to be solved by the MRTU was the future treatment of Existing 
Transmission Contracts (ETCs). An ETC is “an encumbrance, established prior to the 
start-up of the CAISO, in the form of a contractual obligation of a CAISO Participating 
Transmission Owner (PTO) to provide transmission service to another party in 
accordance with terms and conditions specified in the contract, utilizing transmission 
facilities owned by the PTO that have been turned over to CAISO operational control” 
(FERC, 2005, p. 1). In general, an ETC can comprise either transmission service only, or 
it can comprise a combination of transmission service and energy supply. Historically, 
ETCs have played an important role in California’s electricity market: it is estimated that 
ETCs in effect as of February 2007 would represent approximately 19 GW, or 42% of the 
CAISO’s 2004 peak load (FERC, 2005). 
The CAISO recognized that accomplishing the objective of a single congestion 
management scheme would require converting all ETCs to Congestion Revenue Rights 
(CRRs, as financial transmission rights are called in California), thereby eliminating the 
need for separate scheduling provisions. Those entities that voluntarily convert their ETC 
rights to the standard CAISO transmission tariff may execute a waiver of their ETC rights 
or a portion thereof and receive a commensurate, MW-for-MW increase in their CRR 
allocation eligibility (CAISO, 2007).  
The CAISO assumed, however, that some quantity of ETCs would continue to exist in 
their present form at the time the CAISO implements its new market design. Therefore, 
the CAISO came up with a proposal for honoring ETCs under the MRTU. This proposal 
has three main components, which will be described next: (1) scheduling the use of ETC 
rights in the CAISO markets; (2) settlement and allocation of CAISO charges associated 
with ETC schedules; and (3) validating that ETC schedules submitted to the CAISO are 
consistent with the ETC holders' contractual rights (FERC, 2004). 
                                                 
14The U.S. legal debate is mainly about the public interest standard of the so-called Mobile-Sierra doctrine. 
This doctrine, named after two 1956 US Supreme Court decisions, forbids unilateral modifications of 
contracts, but for a limited set of cases in which the contract originally agreed upon adversely affects the 
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(1) Since the start of the California market in April 1998, the CAISO has honored ETCs 
by reserving transmission capacity on a day-ahead basis whether or not this capacity was 
fully scheduled by the ETC rights holder. This capacity is excluded from all ISO markets 
until 20 minutes before the start of the operating hour to allow for schedule increases by 
the ETC rights holders. Any unused transmission capacity is then made available to the 
ISO operators for use in the real-time market (FERC, 2004). 
According to the CAISO, the feasibility of this scheduling aspect of ETCs depends on the 
simplicity of today’s zonal congestion management approach in California. In that 
regard, there are three congestion zones within the CAISO grid that roughly correlate to 
northern, southern and central California15. The CAISO currently sets-aside capacity for 
ETCs in the day-ahead market only on the approx. 30 interties to adjacent control areas 
and on the two internal inter-zonal interfaces (Path 15 and Path 26) by reducing the 
Available Transmission Capacity (ATC). The impact on the remaining 6000 or so 
transmission pathways under the CAISO’s control are completely ignored (FERC, 2004). 
Initially, the CAISO assumed that the practice of setting-aside transmission capacity in 
the inter-zonal interfaces for ETCs could be applied in a straightforward manner to the 
new market design based on LMP. However, later on the CAISO found this approach to 
be problematic, as setting-aside such capacity would not be compatible with a congestion 
management design that models and enforces all constraints in a full network model in 
the forward markets and in real-time. The reason for this is that transmission capacity that 
is set aside on a fully detailed network model actually permeates the entire network 
regardless of the specific injection and withdrawal points designated under the ETC. The 
Market Surveillance Committee of the CAISO emphasized that the market efficiency 
consequences of a setting aside all internal ETC capacity in a day-ahead LMP market are 
much more severe than would be the case under the current zonal market (FERC, 2004). 
Based on this assessment, the CAISO has concluded that the best approach to fully honor 
ETCs is to distinguish between ETCs on the interties and ETCs on the internal network. 
Thus, the CAISO will continue setting aside transmission capacity in the day-ahead 
market for unscheduled ETC rights only on the interties with external control areas. The 
impact of setting aside capacity on these interties would be limited because the full 
network model represents such interties in a radial fashion. 
For ETC rights within its control area, the CAISO will not set aside unscheduled 
capacity. Instead, ETC rights holders will continue to submit balanced schedules to the 
CAISO markets and will be given a scheduling priority over other users of the CAISO 
controlled grid in the day-ahead and hour-ahead markets to the extent such schedules 
conform to the ETC rights holders' contractual rights. In particular, in the day-ahead 
market, valid ETC self-schedules will be the last to be adjusted in the event that 
uneconomic adjustments16 are required to relieve congestion (CAISO, 2008). In the hour-
ahead market, the CAISO states that valid ETC changes would be given scheduling 
                                                 
15
 The three zones are called NP15, SP15, and ZP26. 
16
 A non-economic adjustment is a redispatch that is not based on economic bids and offers, but is required 
for reliability reasons. 
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priority over all other hour-ahead schedule changes17. In real time, the CAISO would 
redispatch non-ETC resources relative to their final hour-ahead schedules, as necessary, 
to accommodate valid real-time ETC schedule changes (FERC, 2005). 
 
(2) With regard to the settlement and allocation of CAISO charges, the CAISO designed 
a “perfect hedge” settlement mechanism that fully and accurately exempts valid ETC 
schedules from all CAISO congestion charges, i.e. both day-ahead and real-time 
congestion charges. Under its proposal, the CAISO, using the simultaneous feasibility 
test in the CRR allocation process, would create ETC CRRs “on paper” and hold them on 
behalf of ETC holders in order to ensure revenue adequacy for CRRs allocated or 
auctioned to other parties. The CAISO will use these CRRs to offset congestion costs 
associated with valid day-ahead ETC schedules. Importantly, such “paper CRRs” will be 
CRR options, i.e. there will be no liability in the case of a negative congestion charge.  
Concerning post day-ahead schedule changes, the FERC determined that because the 
benefits of the CAISO’s more efficient management of ETCs on the transmission system 
under the MRTU accrue to all market participants, it is appropriate to distribute the 
redispatch costs associated with honoring ETC scheduling changes to all non-ETC 
metered demand and exports. This means that ETC parties would not have to bear any 
real-time redispatch cost (FERC, 2004). 
 
 
(3) Validation of ETC schedules means verifying that submitted ETC schedules and 
schedule changes are within the contractual limits specified in ETCs with regard to 
eligible injection and withdrawal locations, maximum MW quantities, scheduling 
deadlines and other relevant parameters. In this regard, the CAISO offers to perform 
automated verification that ETC schedules comply with actual contractual rights (FERC, 
2004). 
 
3.2.1. Transmission Ownership Rights (TORs) 
The CAISO distinguishes between ETCs and Transmission Ownership Rights, where 
transmission rights derive from physical ownership of transmission facilities within the 
CAISO control area that have not been turned over to the CAISO’s operational control18. 
The CAISO states that its ETC Proposal would not apply to TORs. 
 
 
3.3. Case 2: Midwest ISO 
The Midwest ISO (MISO) covers an area of 15 US states plus one Canadian province 
(Manitoba), serving a peak load of approximately 110 GW. When it started operation in 
April 2005, the MISO was the first multi-state RTO without a historical tight power pool 
                                                 
17
 In addition, where contractual rights allow, the CAISO would accept further schedule changes after the 
hour-ahead market closes. 
18
 The California-Oregon Transmission Project (COTP) is the most prominent example of a TOR. 
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to implement a wholesale energy market with centralized economic dispatch and full 
locational marginal pricing for congestion (Drom, 2005).  
When introducing the new market design, one of MISO’s main challenges consisted in 
accommodating existing transmission agreements, which constitute a significant 
percentage of market transactions in the new energy market structure, without abrogating 
the contractual rights of the transmission customers operating under those agreements. In 
the case of MISO, these pre-existing rights are called “Grand-fathered agreements 
(GFAs)” and they involve at least 23% of the load being served in the MISO region 
(Drom, 2005). 
Based on directions from FERC, MISO had to distinguish between two sorts of GFAs: 
(1) Those that could be modified according to the “just and reasonable” standard of the 
Federal Power Act for FERC-directed contract modification, and (2) those that required 
any such change to meet the higher “Mobile-Sierra” public-interest standard, or were 
silent on the applicable standard of review. According to this distinction, MISO proposed 
the following treatment of GFAs (Hogan, 2004; CAISO, 2004; MISO, 2004): 
 
(1) GFAs with a Mobile-Sierra clause (or without a clause on a standard review 
procedure) had to be “carved-out”, respecting the following features set by FERC:  (i) the 
maximum MW capacity for each “carved-out” GFA should be removed from the model 
used for FTR allocation. The unscheduled capacity need not to be set aside physically, 
but special GFA scheduling provisions would remain valid; (ii) schedules submitted by 
the GFA parties in accordance with MISO’s day-ahead timelines should not be subject to 
congestion charges; (iii) MISO should incorporate the GFA parties’ schedules into the 
reliability assessment procedures; and (iv) MISO should allow parties to “carved-out” 
GFAs to settle real-time imbalances through the provisions of their GFAs instead of 
requiring that such imbalances be procured through MISO’s real-time energy market.  
 
(2) Holders of GFAs with a “just and reasonable” review clause could either choose to 
convert voluntarily to the MISO tariff, or they could select between three options for 
treatment of their GFA:  
 
Option A - Market Participants with GFAs can voluntarily choose to be allocated FTRs in 
the same manner as non-GFA Market Participants. Under this Option, the Market 
Participant would be subject to congestion and marginal losses19 charges. Option A is 
essentially the same as a voluntary conversion of GFAs, but it is revocable after one year. 
 
                                                 
19
 Under an LMP scheme, the ISO charges marginal loss costs (instead of average loss costs). Due to the 
quadratic nature of losses with respect power flows, marginal loss pricing leads to a marginal loss surplus 
collected by the ISO. This surplus is usually redistributed to load serving entities. With regard to ETCs, the 
question must be answered whether ETC rights holders have to pay marginal losses, and if so, how they get 
reimbursed. 
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Option B - Market Participants with GFAs can choose not to be allocated FTRs, but 
rather to receive a refund of day-ahead congestion costs and a refund of the difference 
between day-ahead marginal losses and average losses costs.  
 
Option C - Market Participants with GFAs can choose to not be allocated FTRs, nor 
receive a refund of Day-Ahead congestion costs or a refund of the difference between 
Day-Ahead marginal losses and average losses costs. However, the responsible party 
would receive an allocation of marginal losses revenue. 
 
Compared to these options, the proposal from CAISO is closest to option B, but in 
addition reverses real-time congestion charges due to valid post day-ahead ETC schedule 
changes. Also, the CAISO does not distinguish between ETCs including or not including 
Mobile-Sierra clauses. Unlike MISO, the CAISO did not have to “carve-out” any 
unscheduled ETC capacity on its internal network area during the scheduling process. 
 
3.4. Conclusions on ETCs 
These two case studies highlighted several aspects with respect to ETCs and FTRs:  
(1) There are important legal differences between the US and the EU. In the EU, 
ETCs seem to have a weaker legal justification. Even within the US, there are 
legal and regulatory differences which lead to a different treatment of ETCs by 
control area. 
(2) ETCs can be converted to FTRs. This is usually done on a MW-for-MW basis. 
(3) ETCs are often converted to FTR options (not obligations), which means that a 
former ETC rights holder does never face congestion charges, regardless of the 
direction of congestion. 
(4) However, FTRs only cover the congestion aspect of ETCs. Other transmission-
related aspects, such as special provisions regarding the timing of schedules, post 
day-ahead schedule changes, redispatch cost and loss cost, are not covered. Nor 
can FTRs account for any special energy supply provisions of ETCs.  
(5) By design, ETCs are based on a contract-path model. Nevertheless, ETCs can be 
accommodated even with a point-to-point full network model. This is done either 
by “carving” them out of the grid model, or by granting them several special 
provisions within the normal scheduling and settlement schemes. 
 
 
4. Prerequisites for introducing FTRs in Europe 
 
4.1. Relationship between system operation and market operation  
The introduction of FTRs requires a very close cooperation between transmission system 
operation on one hand and market operation on the other hand. This is for several 
reasons:  
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(1) The allocation of FTRs requires a detailed knowledge of the transmission system 
capacity and its development (simultaneous feasibility test) 
(2) The determination of the monetary value of FTRs requires transparent, reliable and 
precise market prices 
(3) The scheduling process has to be done on a power exchange (not through self-
scheduling), while respecting all physical transmission system constraints. 
 
Based on these strong interdependencies between system operation and market operation, 
several ways of how to set them up institutionally have been tried. To a large extent, the 
choice for a design depends on the historic market structure and the complexity of the 
grid topology: 
 
(1) Combination into a single institution: This is the way most US ISO’s and RTO’s 
work. They operate both the transmission system and the energy markets. 
(2) Two institutions, market operator owned by system operator(s): This is the set-up 
in the Nordic Region, where Nordpool is owned by the regional TSOs.  
(3) Two institutions under a common control and ownership: This is the design 
implemented in Italy, where the system operator (TERNA) and the market 
operator (GME) are both indirectly owned by the state (the former through the 
state bank CDP (holding 30% of TERNA shares) and the latter through the 
electricity service provider and parent company GSE). In California, between 
1998 and 2001, there existed a California Power Exchange and a California ISO. 
Both were owned by the state, but they operated largely independent from each 
other. With the new market design (see above), California will adopt the 
institutional approach 1. 
(4) Two independent institutions: This design was chosen in Spain, where the market 
operator OMEL is independent from the system operator REE. However, OMEL 
is tightly regulated by the Spanish government. 
 
Especially the Californian experience between 1998 and 2001 revealed that an 
insufficient coordination between power exchanges and system operators is a real danger 
to market efficiency and system security. For a supra-national power exchange, the 
institutional option 3 is less likely, especially regarding a state ownership. 
Interestingly, the current proposal for the European Spot Exchange (EEX-Powernext 
merger) foresees a split ownership between system operators, market participants, and 
financial institutions (EEX, 2008). The governance and operational details will decide on 
the success of this novel approach. The complex and highly meshed nature of the 
electricity grid operated by the European Spot Exchange may likely turn out to be poorly 
suited for such a compromise. 
 
4.2. Relationship between national market operators 
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When cross-border FTRs are to be implemented, it is important that national markets (1) 
provide liquid and reliable price indexes to determine the value of FTRs and (2) are well 
enough integrated to provide a harmonized market and allow a full collection of 
congestion rents to fund FTRs. These prerequisites can be achieved either through (1) a 
coupling of national market platforms, or through (2) a supra-national market platform.  
 
4.3. Regulation of market operators 
As described in section 1.3 above, with the introduction of FTRs, power exchanges 
would attain a quasi-monopoly position regarding cross-border trade. This is because an 
efficient scheduling of the highly congested cross-border interconnectors must be based 
on economic bids, and can’t be done through self-scheduling, i.e. bilateral trading (in the 
absence of PTRs). Even if bilateral cross-border trading shall remain, it will require 
maximum price difference bids (specifying the highest acceptable congestion charge) to 
compete with exchange-based bids, and thus must be included on the exchange platform.  
Such a quasi-monopoly position, however, has most certainly to be regulated by an 
energy regulator. Among other things, such a regulation would encompass cross-border 
trading fees (in a similar fashion as national grid access tariffs of TSOs are regulated).  
 
4.4. Financial regulation of FTRs 
Sooner or later, the question has to be answered whether or not FTRs are subject to 
financial regulation in Europe. While we cannot answer this question comprehensively at 
this point, we may look at some precedents: 
(1) In the US, FTRs or CRRs are subject to energy regulation at the state and at the 
federal level (through FERC). Other than futures, FTRs/CRRs are not subject to 
regulation by the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) or the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The CFTC does however regulate futures 
and options relying on electricity prices, such as the NYMEX financial instruments 
relying on PJM hub prices (CFTC, 2001). U.S. ISOs sometimes refer to general CFTC 
capital requirement standards as a reference for FTR market participants. Also, FERC 
and the CFTC occasionally cooperate or interfere with each other, such as in the case 
against the Amaranth hedge fund. This case concerned manipulation of natural gas 
futures, though (Energy Legal Blog, 2007). ERCOT distinguishes a physical market 
including CRRs (regulated by the governmental Public Utility Commission of Texas, and 
FERC) and a financial market operated by NYMEX and regulated by the CFTC 
(ERCOT, 2006).  
 
(2) In the European Nordic region, electricity based futures, options and contracts for 
differences (CFDs) are all traded on the Nordpool ASA, which is a licensed exchange 
under Norwegian law and therefore regulated by financial authorities20. Importantly, none 
of these instruments has a connection to the physical capacity of the transmission grid, as 
FTRs do no exist in the Nordic market (see above). 
                                                 
20
 See www.nordpool.com/asa 
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(3) In Italy, CCCs (see above) and the Italian Power Exchange IPEX are regulated by the 
energy regulator AEEG. For the upcoming Italian Derivatives Exchange IDEX, AEET 
will cooperate with CONSOB, the public authority responsible for the Italian securities 
market21.  
 
(4) In 2004, the European Commission enacted the Directive on markets for financial 
derivatives, MiFID (European Commission, 2004). MiFID concerns financial energy 
derivatives, too. According to (European Commission, 2008), there is however an early 
consensus on (i) the need to exempt own-account hedging and (ii) the need to avoid 
extending financial regulation to physical markets. Thus, in case FTRs are seen as part of 
the physical market, they would be exempted from the MiFID.  
 
In conclusion, these precedents indicate that FTRs could be exempted from financial 
regulation in Europe. In favour of this view is the fact that both price and volume of 
FTRs are determined purely by the physical capacity of transmission grid and the 
physical dispatch of generation and loads. Therefore, manipulation of FTRs can only 
happen through manipulation of the physical market, and this is subject to traditional 
energy regulation. Moreover, FTRs are predominantly used for physical hedging 
purposes and only to a limited extent for financial speculation. Notwithstanding these 
circumstances, the question of how to regulate FTRs may have to be reviewed under the 
light of the recent financial crisis. 
 
4.5. Relationship between national system operators 
If FTRs were implemented border by border, based on the existing contract path model, 
not much would have to change with regard to the relationship between national system 
operations. A main difference would of course be that cross-border capacity allocation 
would no longer be done through PTR auctions, but through power exchanges. 
The situation looks different if FTRs were to be introduced based on a point-to-point 
model. In this case, a far more coordinated way of regional system operation would be 
unavoidable, simply because FTRs would need to be created, allocated and settled 
centrally. A common grid model would be mandatory.  
 
 
4.6. Grid model 
The current zonal setting does not preclude the introduction of FTRs per se. Indeed, in 
most US markets, FTRs are defined between load zones and trading hubs consisting of 
several grid nodes (PJM, 2007). This is to foster liquidity. However, this is a purely 
economic aggregation. In contrast, the physical aggregation currently applied in Europe 
is likely to challenge the computation of a simultaneously feasible set of FTRs, and thus, 
the FTR revenue adequacy. Moreover, a zonal market price does not need to be 
representative for individual generators, which could impede the hedging properties for 
                                                 
21
 See www.consob.it and www.autorita.energia.it 
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FTRs, as cross-border scheduling would have be done through the power exchange (no 
self-scheduling with individual generators) 
 
 
5. Further aspects 
 
5.1. Parallel PTR and FTR systems 
The proceeds of PTR auctions, as they are currently in place in many parts of Europe, can 
be allocated to Auction Revenue Right (ARR) holders in a similar way as the proceeds of 
an FTR auction (which is indeed done already, even if in an implicit way through a 
distribution key between and within adjacent countries). However, PTR auction revenue 
can’t be used to fully fund a parallel system of FTRs, as such an approach would in 
general not be revenue adequate. This is because PTR auctions usually fail to collect the 
full congestion rent (i.e. price difference between two locations). As an example, the 
authors compared the day-ahead (hourly) market price spread between the French 
Powernext and the Italian IPEX (Northern zone) with the proceeds of the explicit day-
ahead (hourly) capacity auction on the France-Italy border for the year 2007 (January 1 to 
November 30). Only the direction from France to Italy was considered. A negative price 
spread (higher price at Powernext) was treated as zero price spread (which means that 
FTRs are modelled as options, not obligations). The calculation was on an hourly basis, 
without volume (MW) weighting.  
It turned out that sum of PTR auction proceeds covered between 60% (including hours 
with auction price zero) and 83% (excluding hours with auction price zero) of the sum of 
positive price spreads. Hours with auction price zero indicate either an hour with no 
auction, or an hour with an auction but no price (i.e. no congestion).  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Hourly difference between the market price spread (IPEX North – Powernext) and the 
auction clearing price (FR-IT) in EUR/MWh (revenue inadequacy for positive values). 
 
 
 20 
 
 
Figure 4: Auction price compared to market price spread (both in EUR/MWh). Dots (hours) below 
the red line indicate revenue inadequacy. Hours with auction price zero can be included or excluded, 
depending on their treatment.  
 
 
 
5.2. Physical delivery risk vs. financial congestion risk  
There is an import difference to be made between the physical delivery risk and the 
financial risk stemming from congestion charges. It is sometimes argued that FTRs 
would not be able to guarantee the physical delivery of energy. Indeed, FTRs do not 
include any energy-scheduling component. Under an FTR scheme, physical delivery 
must be ensured by either self-scheduling (such as bilateral trading) or by submitting a 
price-taking bid on a power exchange. While self-scheduling is feasible in the US 
markets and in the national markets in Europe, this would not be the case for European 
cross-border schedules (in the absence of a PTR auctioning, see sections 1.3 and 4.3). 
Therefore, cross-border scheduling certainty would have to be achieved through price-
taking bids on power exchanges, which may lead to increasing prices caused by 
congestion charges. Of course, these congestion charges would be offset by a 
corresponding set of FTRs. The combination of exchange-based pricing and FTRs 
therefore can guarantee certainty with regard to delivery and price, as long as – and this is 
the crucial point – as long as there is enough physical transmission capacity available to 
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serve the load. If this is no longer the case, the grid needs to be upgraded. Nevertheless, 
the introduction of FTRs may influence power exchange reference-prices, which in turn 
may have an impact on any reference-price dependent product or service (e.g. ancillary 
services). 
Compared to this, a PTR is seemingly superior in ensuring the physical delivery of 
energy, as it is a property right or “carve-out” of transmission capacity on a certain path. 
However, this view also relies on the assumption that there is enough physical 
transmission capacity available to serve all loads. 
In case of ETCs, i.e. already allocated capacity that is not auctioned at all, the situation 
gets more complicated. ETCs provide a continuous transmission access to specific 
generation resources. Such resources can be included in the energy balance of a utility (or 
of a state for that matter). By abolishing ETCs and replacing them with FTRs, this 
relationship would be lost.  
 
 
5.3. Transmission rights with physical and financial properties 
A combination of physical and financial properties of transmission rights is also 
conceivable. As an example, a PTR could feature a “Use-It-or-Sell-It (UIOSI)” property, 
i.e. the PTR holder can decide whether he wants to use his transmission right physically 
to transmit power or whether he wants to use it financially by selling it at the relevant 
auction and receive its market value. Interestingly, such a UIOSI property is always 
revenue adequate: In the case of explicit day-ahead auctions, the PTR seller receives the 
day-ahead capacity auction price. In the case of day-ahead market coupling, the PTR 
seller receives the day-ahead market-price difference. Under the assumption of fully 
liquid and coupled power exchanges that provide a reliable reference price, yearly and 
monthly PTRs with a UIOSI property would in effect financially hedge any cross-border 
market price differences. So instead of making a potentially suboptimal scheduling 
decision, a PTR holder would have an incentive to sell his right to the day-ahead market 
coupling and receive the full market price spread. In this regard, a UIOSI PTR seems to 
be an ideal transitional solution towards pure FTRs.  
Another example of combined physical and financial properties is given by the “Firm 
Transmission Rights” (called FirmTR hereafter) that have been implemented by the 
California ISO since 2000 (not to be mistaken with the financial “Congestion Revenue 
Rights” or CRRs that are being implemented under MRTU, see above). Each FirmTR is 
defined by a transmission path across an inter-zonal interface, and is a right to transfer 
power across that interface, in the sense that FirmTR holders have a scheduling priority 
over non-FirmTR holders. That’s why it’s called firm transmission right (physical 
property). Each FirmTR holder is entitled to a share of the “usage charges” that cover 
redispatch cost to the CAISO for managing inter-zonal congestion (financial property). 
FirmTRs are auctioned off and the auction proceeds are credited to the interface 
transmission owners. Such “FTRs” have two main drawbacks: (1) They set 
counterproductive signals for the use of redispatch, and (2) the fact that those bidding for 
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the FirmTRs also received the auction proceeds leads to FirmTR prices that have 
regularly been far above the actual usage or congestion charges, and so distorted the 
auction process (CAISO, 1998; CAISO, 1999).  
 
6. Conclusions 
We showed that cross-border capacity allocation schemes currently implemented in 
Europe continue relying on a contract-path framework, applying physical transmission 
rights (PTRs). The paper concludes that smoothest transition from PTRs to financial 
transmission rights (FTRs) would be achieved by auctioning PTRs with a use-it-or-sell-it 
property and gradually phasing out their physical usage.  
However, the introduction of cross-border FTRs would imply a conceptual shift from the 
current self-scheduling and bilateral approach to cross-border trading in Europe, to more 
of a central-scheduling approach. Such a shift would require several institutional 
prerequisites. National markets would need to be integrated through power exchanges 
(e.g., by market coupling or market splitting) to provide liquid and reliable price signals 
for valuing FTRs and to fully collect the cross-border congestion rent that covers FTRs. 
Especially, it was shown that PTR auction proceeds are generally not a revenue adequate 
source to cover FTRs. As power exchanges would attain a quasi-monopoly status with 
respect to cross-border trading, a tighter relationship between power exchanges and 
transmission system operators (TSOs) would become unavoidable. Several institutional 
options for this have been presented and discussed. A power exchange owned and 
operated by TSOs is the recommended solution for the highly meshed European 
electricity grid. Moreover, a new regulatory approach to power exchanges would be 
needed, including regulated cross-border trading fees. An introduction of regionally 
applied FTRs would also require a closer cooperation between national TSOs, especially 
with regard to the determination of a simultaneously feasible set of FTRs and a more 
detailed grid model reflecting the actual congestion situation.  
With respect to the regulation of FTRs , it was shown that FTRs have usually not been 
subject to financial regulation, as both their price and their volume are determined purely 
by the physical capacity of the transmission grid and the physical scheduling of 
generation and loads. Therefore, any manipulation of FTRs occurs through manipulating 
the physical market, which is covered by traditional energy regulation. Nevertheless, the 
question of financial regulation of FTRs should be reviewed under the impression of the 
recent global financial crisis. 
Regarding existing transmission contracts (ETCs), the paper described the general legal 
context in both the U.S. and the EU. By presenting two U.S. case studies (California and 
Midwest ISO), it was shown that FTRs do cover the congestion cost aspect of ETCs, but 
not more. Importantly, special ETC provisions related to scheduling, transmission and 
energy supply cannot be accounted for by FTRs.  
The paper underlined the fact that there are no historical entitlements to offsetting cross-
border congestion cost in Europe (in the absence of ETCs). Thus, FTRs would not be 
allocated to load scheduling entities for free (as it is partly done in the U.S.), but would 
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be auctioned off with the auction proceeds being allocated to transmission owners or 
transmission investors, e.g. via Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs).  
The authors propose to rename FTRs in the European context, as the term is overused and 
has different meanings for different people. One option would be to take over FERC’s 
wording and call it (cross-border) Congestion Revenue Right (CRR). Another option 
would be a term that emphasizes its cross-border congestion risk hedging property.  
Finally, further research is needed to determine the extent to which financial instruments 
such as futures are able to replace or complement FTRs for hedging the cross-border 
congestion risk.
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